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Dear reader
The buzz around corporate culture has 
been loud for some time. Big tech firms 
such as Google and Twitter have gained 
public attention for their modern and 
innovative work styles, fostering an al-
most hedonistic business culture. And it 
would seem their success proves them 
right. But fancy perks like nap pods and 
on-site physicians are not enough for a 
good corporate culture. So, before you 
start picking out the perfect spot for your 
game corner, it is important to know 
what an effective corporate culture looks 
like. For this, we need to understand how 
culture drives business success. We need 
to ask the right questions, for example: 
How can you make your employees fol-
low your code of ethics? How can you 
motivate everyone to act in the compa-
ny’s best interest? To answer these and 
similar questions, we go back to one of 
the main success factors of humankind: 
our ability to cooperate. Cooperation, 
indeed, turns out to be one of the core 
elements of a successful corporate culture. 
There are many views and opinions on 
what a good corporate culture is like. But 
they often lack a sound understanding of 
what drives behavior in a company. 
Experimental and behavioral economics 
sheds light on the underlying decision-
making processes and helps managers to 
positively influence their employees’ 
behavior. Based on scientific data, it 
provides answers to questions such as 
which rules and incentives are needed for 
a successful corporate culture, how can 
we limit free-rider effects, and how can 
we foster productive and constructive 
cooperation among employees? Finding 
answers to these questions is important, 
because you certainly do not want your 
employees ending up like the hen and the 
pig in the fable below. 
All that remains is to wish you a good 
read through the behavioral foundations 
of corporate culture.
Dr. Ladina Jenal
COO, UBS International Center of 
Economics in Society
Editorial
Source: Folk tale. Illustration by Maura Wyler.
“Don’t worry,” said hen, 
“someone is always the loser 
when folks cooperate.”
Hen said to pig: “You know, we ought to cooper-
ate. So many people like ham and eggs.”
Pig said: “What a brilliant idea!” The pig 
started thinking, and after some time said: 
“What will actually happen to me?”
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Talking about corporate culture has 
become quite popular in the business 
world. But why should companies care 
about corporate culture at all? Why do 
“soft” concepts like culture matter? 
Can’t companies simply rely on “hard” 
facts – the value of clear and efficient 
institutional rules and incentives? 
In this Public Paper, we argue that corpo-
rate culture is important because human 
behavior is always co-determined by the 
prevailing social norms. It is in the com-
pany’s interest to shape these norms 
through a cooperative culture that mobi-
lizes employees’ voluntary cooperation in 
the pursuit of the firm’s performance 
goals. Our research provides behavioral 
foundations for cooperative cultures, 
based on important scientific insights 
from contract economics as well as from 
experimental and behavioral economics. 
In particular, contractual incompleteness, 
the imperfections of centralized monitor-
ing, and limits to contract enforcement 
naturally constrain firms’ ability to regu-
late and direct their employees’ behavior. 
This causes severe free-rider problems, 
which can be solved with cooperative 
corporate cultures based on social norms 
that increase the company’s overall per-
formance. We show that a large share of 
the people is typically willing to follow 
prosocial norms at least partially if they 
believe that other people and, in particu-
lar the top leaders, will also comply. An 
important reason to legitimize coopera-
tive norms, perhaps the most important 
one, is that they transparently increase 
the firm’s overall value and generate 
long-run benefits for the involved parties. 
As a firm’s workforce is typically com-
posed of people with different propensi-
Extended abstract
ties for voluntary cooperation, it is 
inevitable that some of them will free 
ride on others’ efforts if sanctions do not 
enforce rules and norms. The failure to 
comply with norms has the tendency to 
spread if appropriate measures do not 
constrain it. However, forces similar to 
those that lead to contractual incom-
pleteness and imperfect monitoring also 
limit the centralized enforcement of 
norms. Peer feedback and peer sanction-
ing are therefore required for imple-
menting and enforcing a cooperative 
culture. The optimal conditions for the 
effectiveness of peer feedback exist when 
it is an integral part of a company’s cor-
porate culture and when all involved 
parties recognize that peer feedback 
increases the firm’s overall performance 
and all stakeholders benefit from it. 
Classifying corporate culture problems 
along the two dimensions “willingness to 
cooperate” and “awareness of negative 
externalities” has proven to be useful for 
determining the appropriate set of mea-
sures for solving these problems. Depend-
ing on the problem, the measures are in 
the areas of “changing awareness”, 
“changing incentives and motivation”,  
or both.
A final important lesson is that the mere 
proclamation of abstract values does not 
suffice for achieving a cooperative cul-
“Culture, more than rule books, 
determines how an organization 
behaves”
Warren Buffet in one of his biennial letters  
to Berkshire Hathaway Managers
5ture. These values need to be translated 
into concrete behavioral rules on the 
“shop floor” that are widely shared and 
enforced by top management and the 
employees themselves. To engineer com-
pliance, the behavioral rules must be 
clear and simple. Further, they must 
transparently contribute to a firm-specific 
public good, such that employees can 
agree with them – because otherwise they 
will not enforce them.
To engineer compliance, the 
behavioral rules must be clear  
and simple.
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Every company has a corporate culture. 
Some companies shape their culture 
deliberately and according to well-
founded principles, in others it emerges 
from uncontrolled and poorly under-
stood processes, operating behind the 
management’s veil of ignorance. We 
define corporate culture as the set of  
formal and informal social norms in a 
company that affect employee’s percep-
tions, motives, intentions, and behaviors. 
Because corporate culture is an impor-
tant determinant of employees’ behavior 
it has deep and important effects on 
companies’ overall performance. 
Social norms are defined as a group’s 
commonly known standards of behavior 
that are based on widely shared views 
of how individual group members ought 
to behave in given situations.¹ “Widely 
shared” means that group members know 
and widely approve the standard and that 
this widespread approval is generally 
known. There are many examples of busi-
ness-related social norms such as “always 
treat others with respect”, “don’t share 
confidential information” or “inform cli-
ents honestly about both advantages and 
disadvantages of the firm’s products”. 
In the business context, the group to 
which a normative standard applies may 
comprise all of the company’s employees 
or a subset of them. The set of situations 
in which a company’s normative stan-
dards apply is very large; it typically 
encompasses how the employees and  
different departments interact with each 
other, how employees behave towards 
their managers and vice versa, and how 
employees behave towards the compa-
ny’s customers and input suppliers.  
Companies often codify some normative 
standards in the form of explicit, written  
What is  
“corporate culture”?
rules – for example, in the form of a code 
of ethics. However, a large number of 
standards remain informal: although 
unwritten, the employees subject to such 
normative standards know and share 
them widely, and act according to them.
Corporate culture has deep and 
important effects on companies’ 
overall performance.
7Normative principles of behavior inevita-
bly emerge when people interact with 
each other – in fact, there appear to be no 
human societies without some form of 
normative governance. Thus, companies 
cannot prevent social norms from perme-
ating their employees’ behaviors. But are 
the prevailing norms conducive or dys-
functional for the company’s overall 
goals? Moreover, does the management 
have the right insights and tools to shape 
these norms? 
Why should management care about the 
prevailing informal norms and the asso-
ciated corporate culture? In most compa-
nies, management uses carrots – various 
forms of reward – and sticks – sanctions 
– to regulate employees’ behavior. Thus, 
why is it not possible to induce almost 
any desired behaviors by rewarding 
employees, and to rule out undesirable 
behaviors by imposing appropriate sanc-
tions? Why can’t the company just set up 
a system where every employee works 
under an enforceable contract that 
induces those behaviors that are most 
conducive for company performance? 
Corporate culture matters because 
employment contracts are necessarily 
fundamentally incomplete.2–4 In princi-
ple, employers can provide incentives 
that are associated with employees’ 
effort behavior or with their output. 
Notice that the notion of “effort” goes 
far beyond what everyday language  
associates with effort; it includes every 
behavior and mental operation that has 
pecuniary or psychological costs for the 
employee and provides benefits (i.e.,  
output) for the company. It is typically 
not possible to stipulate the dimensions 
and the quantity of current and future 
effort levels in a contract that is suffi-
Why corporate culture 
matters ...
ciently precise – nor are the various 
dimensions of effort objectively verifi-
able. Likewise, it is impossible to define 
and verify precisely the current and 
future output for most employees. These 
limits to defining, measuring and moni-
toring an employee’s effort and output 
necessarily limit the regulatory power of 
explicit rewards and sanctions. Employ-
ees therefore have many opportunities to 
reduce their effort without worrying too 
much about sanctions. Likewise, there 
are many situations where extra effort 
remains undetected and thus unrewarded. 
In other words, many employees affect 
companies’ overall performance posi-
tively without being rewarded, or nega-
tively without being sanctioned. 
A cooperative corporate culture bridges 
the inevitable gap that arises from the  
limits of formal rewards and punishments 
due to incomplete contracts, imperfect 
monitoring and imperfect verifiability.  
A cooperative corporate culture makes it 
more likely that employees will work dili-
gently even if their behavior cannot be 
observed, that they will take initiative to 
improve the firm’s operations even if there 
is no immediate reward, and that they 
will provide constructive feedback when 
their colleagues violate normative behav-
ioral standards. In short, a cooperative 
corporate culture mobilizes employees’ 
“voluntary cooperation” in the pursuit of 
the firm’s overall strategic goals. Note 
that the term “cooperation” is defined 
here in an encompassing way and goes far 
beyond the narrow notion of “people 
simply coordinating their activities” or 
“working together”. 
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From a firm’s viewpoint, it is often very 
desirable for employees to help each 
other because it avoids frictions in the 
production of goods and services that 
may otherwise occur. However, if employ-
ees help each other, the helper has at 
least a time cost typically without being 
financially rewarded for helping, nor 
sanctioned for shirking. In fact, it is sim-
ply impossible to enumerate, describe, 
and contractually fix the myriad of help-
ing opportunities that arise in compa-
nies. But why should an employee help  
if there is only a cost and no reward? 
This is exactly the kind of dilemma that 
a cooperative corporate culture helps  
to resolve. 
Winston Churchill once remarked that it 
is easy to give a speech over 45 minutes 
but very hard to give one for 45 seconds. 
Likewise, it is easy to write a long but 
unfocussed mail that informs others in a 
department of an important issue, but 
hard to write a short and concise mail. 
Thus, suppose that an employee, call him 
or her Andrea, needs to inform 40 col-
leagues about a new product. Andrea 
can write a long e-mail in 15 minutes, or 
a clear and concise one in 45 minutes. 
The e-mail recipients need seven minutes 
to read and understand the long one, but 
only two minutes for the short one. 
Thus, the long message saves Andrea 30 
minutes but imposes time costs of 200 
minutes on the other 40 employees. Yet, 
Andrea has little or no incentive to spend 
time on a shorter e-mail unless a cooper-
ative culture induces to do so. 
Another example relates to sales activi-
ties, specifically to how sales people posi-
tion the advantages of a firm’s product 
and what information they give to cus-
tomers. The pharmaceutical industry, 
... and why cooperation?
which sells drugs to doctors, provides  
an interesting case here because of the 
tight legal constraints on what a sales 
person may claim about a drug. The 
legally permissible claims are often stated 
explicitly in the drug’s instruction leaflet. 
However, the sales person may have  
supplementary knowledge or even privi-
leged information about a drug’s posi-
tive (or negative) side effects, e.g., 
because the company has performed 
further tests. In some cases, advertising 
additional positive effects to doctors  
is illegal because the relevant clinical 
procedures that will eventually grant 
permission to claim additional benefits 
have not yet been completed. In this sit-
uation, the phar-maceutical sales people 
have a strong incentive to claim addi-
tional drug benefits in personal interac-
tions with doctors because this is likely 
to increase their sales. This individual 
behavior may be illegal, and the com-
pany may thus risk severe penalties. In 
fact, the US authorities have imposed 
harsh financial sanctions – billions  
of dollars – on several pharmaceutical 
companies for exactly this type of legal 
violations, which sales personnel com-
mitted in and outside the US. 
There is a panoply of similar examples 
across the globe and industries. Think of 
the “emission scandal” in the automotive 
industry, where several car producers 
It is simply impossible to enumer-
ate, describe, and contractually 
fix the myriad of helping opportu-
nities that arise in companies.
9used software to deceive regulators mea-
suring emissions from diesel cars. Con-
sider international companies that were 
involved in bribing public officials to  
get contracts or legal permissions. Or 
think of the “Libor scandal”, “currency 
manipulations”, or the overstepping of 
risk limits by investment bankers which 
caused large subsequent losses. In all 
these examples human behaviors cause 
the problem and the prevailing corporate 
culture did not prevent them from hap-
pening. 
Reducing the role of a cooperative cul-
ture to legal and compliance issues is, 
however, far too narrow. The violation 
of legal rules is just an extreme form of 
opportunistic, noncooperative behavior. 
A company’s daily operations involve a 
myriad of cooperative behaviors that are 
necessary for its overall success. Notice 
that cooperation is not blind obedience 
and uniformity; it also may involve  
challenging the prevailing strategy and 
course of action, and speaking up – a 
behavior that is perceived as costly by 
many employees. But the purpose of a 
cooperative culture is to make employees 
behave cooperatively despite opportun-
istic incentives not to do so.
10
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A cooperative culture is characterized by 
widespread adherence to those norma-
tive company standards that facilitate the 
achievement of the company’s goals. 
Such a culture gives employees a reason 
to trust that their colleagues will also 
adhere to the prevalent culture and, as 
we will show later, this trust will itself 
drive obedience with the cooperative cul-
ture and strengthen it. Companies that 
establish a cooperative culture should 
thus be more productive and successful. 
A recent study examines the connection 
between cooperative culture and finan-
cial success of the best 100 companies in 
the US.5 This study uses the company 
employees’ views to determine how 
strong the cooperative culture is. The 
study finds that simply proclaiming and 
advertising prosocial values such as 
integrity, ethical conduct, trust, or hon-
esty has no impact on the firms’ financial 
success. However, those firms where the 
employees perceive their top managers as 
trustworthy and ethical in their business 
practices show higher productivity and 
profits. 
Research on national cultures and nations’ 
success reached a similar conclusion 
regarding the potential value of coopera-
tive cultures. The same key forces that 
generate trust and trustworthiness at the 
national level also induce trust within 
smaller units such as villages, cities, or 
companies. Regardless of whether we 
look at companies or communities, offi-
cial sanctioning systems are quite limited 
in their ability to regulate behavior. In 
addition, contracts between independent 
parties are, in principle, largely subject to 
the same constraints in terms of com-
pleteness and enforceability as employ-
ment contracts. Thus, similar limits to 
Cooperative cultures and 
success
contracting apply within firms, between 
firms and between people, implying that 
cooperative national cultures are as 
important for a country’s performance  
as corporate cultures are for a firm’s per-
formance.6, 7 The research on the rela-
tionship between national cultures and 
national success relates measures of 
regional and national trust – which can 
be taken as proxies for the actual level  
of cooperation and trustworthiness at the 
regional or national level – to national 
income data. 
Figure 1 shows that there is a positive 
correlation between “generalized trust in 
strangers” at the country level and the 
countries’ income per capita (measured 
in natural logarithms). This figure sup-
ports the view that countries that are 
able to establish institutional environ-
ments and norms that lead to a high level 
of cooperation and trustworthiness, and 
thus trust, flourish significantly better. 
This provides reason to believe that there 
is a positive relationship between the 
“cooperativeness” of companies’ busi-
ness cultures and their overall success.
Those firms in which the  
employees perceive their top  
managers as trustworthy 
and ethical in their business 
practices show higher 
productivity and profits.
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Income per capita (1980 to 2009) plotted against average trust (1981 to 2008); N= 106 countries
Fig. 1   The relationship between trust and growth
Note: Figure 1 plots the average income per capita (ln) between 1980 and 2009 against the average trust between 1981 and 2008 
for a sample of 106 countries. It illustrates the relationship between generalized trust at the national levels – which is a proxy for the 
general trustworthiness towards strangers in a population – and countries’ income per capita. Countries with higher levels of trust 
also display higher income levels.
Source: Algan and Cahuc 2013
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In the previous examples of potential 
employee opportunism (e.g., in the e-mail 
example or the sales example from the 
pharmaceutical industry), there are incen-
tives to engage in behaviors that are ben-
eficial for the individual employee but 
detrimental to the firm’s overall perfor-
mance. These examples represent instances 
of the free-rider problem that arise in the 
context of a public good: individual 
employees enjoy the public good – for 
example, by benefitting from a firm’s 
good performance – without contributing 
much to it because of their opportunistic 
behavior. 
The public good aspect in corporate cul-
ture problems is most salient when it 
comes to a company’s public reputation, 
which is perhaps its most valuable asset. 
Warren Buffet pointed this out in one of 
his biennial letters to the Berkshire Hatha-
way managers: “The top priority – trump-
ing everything else, including profits – is 
that all of us continue to zealously guard 
Berkshire’s reputation. We can’t be perfect 
but we can try to be. As I’ve said in these 
memos for more than 25 years: We can 
afford to lose money – even a lot of 
money. But we can’t afford to lose reputa-
tion – even a shred of reputation.” Thus, 
establishing and maintaining a good pub-
lic reputation is perhaps the most impor-
tant task of a cooperative corporate 
culture. 
Why is a company’s reputation a public 
good? It is so because every stakeholder 
of the company benefits from a good 
reputation but has little individual incen-
tive to contribute to it. The employees as 
a whole benefit because if the firm pro-
duces high value, it has more leeway to 
pay higher salaries. Capital owners ben-
efit because the firm’s shares increase  
Cooperative cultures and 
public goods
in value. Sales personnel benefits from  
a good reputation because it is easier to 
sell the firm’s products. HR managers 
benefit because they can recruit better 
employees. The firm can attract inputs at 
better terms of trade and secure financial 
capital (e.g., loans) at lower cost. Finally, 
quite simply, it is just nicer for every 
employee to work for a company with a 
good reputation. Nevertheless, because 
of the inevitable imperfections and 
incompleteness of employment contracts 
and financial reward systems mentioned 
earlier, employees often face individual 
incentives for behaviors that undermine 
the firm’s reputation. Specifically, they 
can free ride on the firms’ reputation  
and enjoy the benefits without the need 
to contribute, even if they undermine the 
reputation. 
Ideally, a cooperative corporate culture 
successfully induces the firm’s employees 
to contribute to firm-specific public 
goods despite the existence of pecuniary 
incentives to free ride. But how can we 
achieve this?
13
  
Measuring cooperation with 
experimental games
Experimental games enable researchers to 
measure how much of their own payoff people 
are willing to sacrifice to provide benefits to their 
group. These games are typically played one-
shot, with anonymous partners and with real 
monetary stakes. Experimental games usually 
take place in laboratories equipped with a large 
set of networked computers on which partici-
pants can be tested simultaneously in interac-
tive settings.  
There are different experimental games, such 
as coordination games or market games. To 
measure people’s willingness to cooperate, 
researchers work with public goods games, 
which represent a generalization of the prison-
ers’ dilemma game. In a public goods game, 
players receive tokens, which they can simul-
taneously invest in any proportion into a private 
or public project. Investment into the public 
project maximizes the aggregate earnings of the 
group; yet, each individual can gain more from 
investing into the private project. For example, if 
an individual in a group of five invests CHF 1 into 
the public project, then each of the five benefits 
CHF 0.4 from this investment (i.e., the group 
benefits CHF 2). In this case, the incentive 
structure of a public good prevails: each indi-
vidual has a selfish incentive to freeride, but the 
group as a whole benefits from individual invest-
ments. Typically, players begin by investing half 
their tokens on average. However, many invest 
either all or none. When the game is repeated 
over time, with feedback on the other player’s 
decisions at the end of each round, investments 
decline until only a small fraction (approx. 10%) 
of the players invest anything. 
How can we get people to invest in public 
goods in spite of these effects? A large body of 
evidence shows that many people are willing to 
reward fair, cooperative behavior and to punish 
unfair, noncooperative behavior in public goods 
games. Indeed, when players in the public 
goods experiment can punish others, many 
players who invested in the public good punish 
the players who did not invest, even when this 
comes at a cost for them. This in turn encour-
ages further investments, leading players closer 
to the efficient solution in which everyone 
invests.
Laboratory for experimental and behavioral eco-
nomics at  the University of Zurich’s Department of 
Economics.
What are public goods?
Public goods are goods that are nonrivalrous 
and nonexcludable. That is, a public good  
is a product or service that one individual 
can consume without reducing its availability 
to another individual, and from which no one 
is excluded. Broadcasting services, public 
water supplies, street lighting for roads and 
motorways, or clean air in public space are 
examples for public goods.
14
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If all people act entirely selfishly and only 
aim to maximize their pecuniary returns,  
it would be impossible to prevent employ-
ees from free riding – unless there were 
explicit pecuniary reward and sanctioning 
systems in place. Yet, as argued above, 
these systems are inevitably incomplete 
and imperfect: Does this mean that we 
just have to live with the prevalence of 
free riding? Fortunately, there is a large 
body of both circumstantial and experi-
mental evidence suggesting that a sizeable 
share of individuals is not entirely self-
ishly motivated. To be sure, this evidence 
does not say that these people are com-
pletely selfless, without a pinch of self-
interest. Yet, evidence shows that they are 
willing to constrain their self-interest by 
contributing to public goods. 
Figure 2 is based on the results of a public 
goods experiment in which four subjects 
were endowed with money that they 
could either keep for themselves or invest 
into a public good.8 Every dollar invested 
into the public good led to a return of 
$0.4 for the investor, and each of the 
other group members also benefitted $0.4 
from the investment. The group as whole 
therefore earns $1.6 per dollar invested, 
but the investing individual loses $0.6 per 
dollar invested. This incentive structure 
captures the public good problem in a 
nutshell. The group as a whole would be 
better off if everyone invested their whole 
individual endowment in the public good, 
but individuals face strong free-riding 
incentives to keep the money for them-
selves. 
Figure 2 shows how much individuals 
are voluntarily willing to invest into the 
public good, depending on what they 
believe that others in the group will con-
tribute to the public good on average. 
Conditional voluntary  
cooperation comes into play
Note: The figure shows the relationship between contributions to the public 
good at the individual level and individuals’ expectations about others’ 
average cooperation.
Source: Fischbacher, Gaechter, and Fehr 2001
Investment in the public good (dollars)
Fig. 2 Own investments in the public good as a function of others’ 
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These experiments have been replicated 
across the globe,9 with a typical out-
come: the vast majority of individuals 
(between 70 and 90%) belong to one of 
two large groups. On the one hand, there 
are those individuals who free ride com-
pletely, i.e., contribute nothing regardless 
of their expectations about others’ aver-
age contribution; let us call them the 
“selfish type”. On the other hand, there 
are individuals who substantially increase 
their own contribution to the public good 
if they believe that others will increase 
their contributions; we call them the 
“reciprocators” or “conditional coopera-
tors”. Notice that conditional cooperation 
is typically “imperfect”, meaning that if 
others increase their average contribution 
by $1, conditional cooperators increase 
theirs, on average, by less than $1. In the 
example in Figure 2, there are more con-
ditional cooperators (50%) than selfish 
types (30%), but this may change with 
the size of the financial disadvantage that 
an individual incurs from a contribution 
to the public good.I For example, a public 
goods experiment with a return of $0.7 
instead of $0.4 would lead to higher and 
more frequent cooperation. In fact, when 
we use the label “reciprocator”, “condi-
tional cooperator” or “selfish type” 
below, we do not imply that a given indi-
vidual always behaves in a conditionally 
cooperative, respectively selfish way: 
whether people cooperate or free ride also 
depends on the cost of cooperation (e.g., 
the $0.6 an individual loses in our public 
goods experiment). However, this fact 
does not rule out systematic differences 
across individuals in their willingness to 
shoulder these costs, and it makes sense to 
classify them into two types for analytical 
purposes – one type who is willing to bear 
relatively high costs (“conditional cooper-
ators”) and another type who is willing to 
bear only relatively low costs of coopera-
tion (“selfish type”).
Whether people cooperate or free 
ride also depends on the cost of 
cooperation.
I The remaining 20% show somewhat irregular patterns of behavior such as initially increasing and then 
decreasing their contributions as a function of beliefs about others’ average cooperation.
16
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The findings illustrated in Figure 2 have 
important implications. Not only is a 
sizeable proportion of people willing to 
cooperate, but we can also influence 
their behavior by shifting their expecta-
tions about other people’s average co-
operation. If expectations become more 
pessimistic, conditional cooperators will 
reduce their cooperation; if they become 
more optimistic, they will increase it. 
Conditional cooperators are willing to 
share the burden of contributing to a 
cooperative corporate culture, but only  
if others do so as well. 
An immediate implication of these het-
erogeneous types – reciprocators and 
selfish ones – is that, all else being equal, 
a company would always prefer to employ 
a reciprocator rather than a selfish type. 
In other words, “character” is as impor-
tant in hiring people as “skill”. Thus, 
investing resources in finding and select-
ing cooperative types must be part of the 
toolkit of a cooperative corporate cul-
ture. Moreover, a strong focus on finan-
cial incentives may be counterproductive 
because it may attract selfish types and 
discourage reciprocators to apply for  
a job.  
Conditional cooperation also explains 
why leadership is so important: Leaders 
have a high visibility and set an example 
with their words and actions that influ-
ences the expectations about others’ 
cooperation. If leaders fail to live up to 
the normative demands of a cooperative 
culture – for instance, by creating doubts 
about their willingness to go the extra 
mile, or by ignoring obvious misconduct 
– they cannot expect their employees to 
do better. This is also supported by 
experimental evidence10–12 and the study 
mentioned above5 that reports higher 
financial performance in those companies 
where employees perceive their leaders to 
be trustworthy and ethical in their busi-
ness practices. 
Leaders’ overall approach to establishing 
and enforcing a cooperative culture is 
decisive. By making clear that violations 
from cooperative norms are undesirable 
and not tolerated, they can shift employ-
ees’ expectations in a positive direction. 
In fact, measures to steer the selfish types 
towards more cooperation – be it through 
financial rewards, sanctions, or some 
other mechanism – will generally shift 
expectations about others’ cooperation 
in a more positive direction. Thus, explicit 
incentives and sanctions can help achieve 
a cooperative culture. Due to the exis-
tence of conditional cooperators, an 
effective incentive system has a multipli-
cative effect on company performance. 
In addition to directly increasing peoples’ 
contributions to the overall success of 
the company, it will also have indirect 
positive effects by rendering expectations 
about others’ contributions more opti-
mistic.
On leadership, selective hiring, 
and shifting expectations
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Figure 2 shows that conditional coopera-
tion is on average below perfection – a 
rise in the expected cooperation level of 
others by $1 induces individuals to raise 
their cooperation by less than $1. This 
limitation is a robust empirical feature 
across many studies and has important 
implications: mere appeals for voluntary 
cooperation generally do not suffice for 
achieving a cooperative culture. In par-
ticular, high and stable levels of voluntary 
cooperation are difficult to achieve when 
a nonnegligible share of the population 
is of the selfish type.13, 14
Figure 3 illustrates these difficulties and 
shows the dynamic consequences of 
imperfect conditional cooperation. Sup-
pose that there is an initial expectation 
that people will on average contribute 
80% of their endowment to the public 
good. If all people were perfect condi-
tional cooperators they would respond 
to this initial expectation by contributing 
80% of their endowment (Point 0) but 
based on the population’s average behav-
ior, the average cooperation rate for this 
expectation will only be 50% of the 
endowment (Point 1). People are there-
fore likely to adjust their expectation 
downwards, perhaps to 50% (Point 2), 
but the average cooperation rate for this 
expectation will then be only about 30% 
of the endowment (Point 3), which then 
leads to a further decrease in expecta-
tion. The consequence of this dynamic 
process is that cooperation will eventu-
ally break down – a pattern that is 
indeed often observed empirically. 
The limits of voluntary  
cooperation 
Note: Initially, individuals expect high average contribution rates, say 80% 
of the endowment. On average, this induces them to contribute 50%. 
Therefore, expectations are disappointed which leads to a downwards revisi-
on of expectations to say, 50% of the endowment. Yet, if individuals expect 
50% they will in fact only contribute roughly 30%, causing a further downwards 
revision of expectations.
Source: Fehr and Fischbacher 2003
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Fig. 3 The dynamic consequences of imperfect conditional 
 cooperation
0 10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
45° line
Average 
conditional 
contribution
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
C
on
di
tio
na
l c
on
tr
ib
ut
io
n
1 
0 
2
3
Perfect conditional cooperation, 
reflecting initial expectation 
about others’ contribution
Initial conditional contribution 
based on initial expectation
Revised expectation about 
others’ average contribution
Next period’s conditional 
contribution based on the 
revised expectation
0
1
2
3 
Expectation about what others contribute on average 
18
UBS Center Public Paper Behavioral Foundations of Corporate Culture
Figure 4 illustrates this and shows how 
overall cooperation drops because of 
imperfect voluntary cooperation. While 
initial cooperation is on average halfway 
between zero and 100 percent of the 
endowment, it eventually breaks down 
because there is no mechanism to stop 
the downward trend. 
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Fig.  4 The decline in overall cooperation due to imperfect  
conditional cooperation
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If voluntary cooperation alone is not 
enough to establish a cooperative culture 
– what tools and mechanisms are then 
left? Due to their inevitable imperfec-
tions, neither centralized monitoring  
nor sanctioning based on enforceable 
contracts are ways out of the dilemma. 
Indeed, the very necessity of voluntary 
cooperation arises precisely because of 
these imperfections. 
Selective hiring of very cooperative 
employees provides a possible solution 
for small firms. In fact, there is  
evidence15 that the selective hiring of 
“highly cooperative types” into a public 
goods experiment leads to high and  
stable cooperation levels. In contrast,  
if subjects characterized by only a 
medium or low willingness to cooperate 
are selected, cooperation levels are 
lower and eventually cooperation 
unravels. 
However, the strategy of selectively hir-
ing cooperators also has its limitations:  
If job candidates know that their coop-
erativeness affects the hiring decision, 
they have every reason to hide their true 
characters and at least appear to be 
cooperative. Imperfections in discover-
ing the true cooperativeness will prob-
ably always lead to a mixed population 
of reciprocators and selfish employees 
in a company. To make it even gloomier: 
Even if it were possible to discriminate 
between reciprocators and selfish types 
perfectly, given the large share of selfish 
types within the overall population, it is 
simply impossible for every firm to just 
employ reciprocators. In larger firms, in 
particular, there will inevitably be a het-
erogeneous mix of types. However, selec-
tive hiring can be a solution for small 
firms.
Is peer feedback the answer?
So, we are back on square one: If selec-
tive hiring alone provides no general 
solution, what remains? A considerable 
body of evidence suggests that peer moni-
toring and peer sanctioning can be a 
solution. If it is transparent that the pub-
lic good benefits everyone in the group, 
individual contributions to the public 
good tend to automatically become the 
“the right thing” to do. In other words, 
people consider it normatively appropri-
ate for everyone to contribute to the 
public good. However, just because it is 
normatively correct to contribute does 
not make people contribute automati-
cally. Specifically, free riders must receive 
feedback, reminding them that they, too, 
should contribute. This feedback can 
vary from an innocuous hint to a sharp 
social sanction. 
In practice, peer sanctions can be very 
mild – sometimes, they are not even con-
sidered as a sanction. This is the case 
when a group member, for instance an 
employee, reminds a colleague of the 
normative duties with a friendly “By the 
way, it would be very nice of you if you 
did …”. Peer sanctions can take on many 
other forms, from a simple raised eye-
brow to a smirk, from ridiculing to 
ostracism, from a friendly face-to-face 
conversation over a general discussion 
without finger pointing to a public state-
ment that singles out individuals as per-
petrators. Some of these sanctions are 
clearly costly or risky for those who raise 
the concern or initiate the sanction, and 
some may even be destructive for a team. 
This raises the question whether enough 
people are willing to bear these costs of 
providing feedback, and what the appro-
priate and legitimate forms of feedback 
are. Clearly, peer feedback in a company 
context should be constructive and 
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socially compatible with a cooperative 
culture; indeed, allowing for positive and 
negative feedback has better effects than 
just focusing on negative feedback, e.g., 
in form of sanctions.16 Perhaps one of 
the most important requirements is that, 
in every part of the organization, peer 
feedback is a widely known, approved 
and accepted approach, acknowledged to 
improve the overall functioning and per-
formance of the organization.   
There is a large body of evidence1, 17 
showing that a significant share of the 
people is willing to bear the cost of sanc-
tioning free riders if there is a transpar-
ent normative case against free riding. 
Take, for example, the subjects in Figure 
4, whose cooperation just broke down: 
they are given an opportunity to provide 
feedback to their peers after having seen 
their peers’ contributions to the public 
good. In the specific experiment, they 
could only give negative feedback by 
assigning “disapproval points” to their 
peers. Assigning a disapproval point 
implied a cost of $1 for the feedback 
provider, and a cost of roughly $3 for  
the criticized peer. With these monetized 
sanctions, providing feedback becomes 
unambiguously costly for both parties.  
It allows us to study the behavioral 
implications of costly sanctioning: If 
somebody assigns points to free riders, 
we know that he or she is willing to  
pay to sanction them. Of course, other 
types of feedback and sanctions will 
apply in a company context. 
What effect did peer-sanctioning oppor-
tunities have on cooperation? Remember 
that cooperation unraveled almost com-
pletely in our example of Figure 4, when 
no sanctioning opportunity was avail-
able. For convenience, the first graph of 
Figure 5 again illustrates this break-
down of cooperation, while the second 
graph shows that cooperation immedi-
ately increases up to a level of nearly 
100% after the introduction of the peer-
sanctioning opportunity. The same indi-
viduals who cannot prevent a cooperation 
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Fig.  5 Voluntary feedback and sanctioning overcomes the limits 
 of voluntary cooperation
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breakdown where feedback opportuni-
ties are missing, can achieve nearly full 
cooperation when feedback is possible! 
This pattern suggests the following les-
son: When the group benefits of a public 
good are transparent, contributions to 
the public good become the normatively 
appropriate behavior, which legitimizes 
the sanctioning of the free riders. In the 
experiment mentioned above, those who 
free rode the most received the harshest 
sanctions, while mild free riders were 
typically only sanctioned mildly. In sum-
mary, the moral message of the sanction 
is clear: “Thou shalt not free ride.” In 
fact, subjects who were sanctioned typi-
cally raise their cooperation levels imme-
diately, and recent evidence shows that 
cooperatively motivated sanctions even 
increase norm obedience in situations 
where the individual cannot be observed.18
In summary, the moral message  
of the sanction is clear: 
“Thou shalt not free ride.”
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How can we use the previous insights on 
the determinants of a cooperative culture 
to solve cooperation problems in practice? 
To illustrate this, we consider a real case 
from the media industry. One of the larg-
est media corporations in a European 
country had bought more than 100 smaller 
and medium-sized firms over a period of 
15 years. The new owner of these compa-
nies reorganized them into roughly 30 
independent profit centers, and gave them 
the freedom to decide about production 
and sale of media content, the choice of 
technology, etc. This decentralization 
helped to keep decision-making processes 
at the profit center level quick and flexible, 
and it provided good incentives for effec-
tively managing the centers. 
However, the division into many profit 
centers had the major disadvantage that 
this media corporation could not play the 
big player card. As it is generally known, 
the largest units in the media market are 
typically able to attract much more atten-
tion and lure more customers for a longer 
time on their websites, than smaller units 
are. Thus, many more people see an ad  
on the website and this attention premium 
makes it in turn very attractive for adver-
tising companies to buy more ads at even 
higher prices. In principle, the executive 
management of the media corporation 
seemed to have an easy technical solution 
for this problem: Request that individual 
profit centers link their websites to gener-
ate an overall web-traffic system. Yet, this 
solution has a drawback: Individual profit 
centers have little reason to generate web-
traffic for their perceived competitors, 
even if they are part of the same corpora-
tion. 
This is a classic public goods problem. 
Overall revenues are maximized by link-
Case study: Cooperation between 
profit centers
ing the profit centers’ websites, but each 
individual center has an incentive to free 
ride. The management of the media cor-
poration recognized that simply imposing 
central authority did not work. Specifi-
cally, the centers had identified ways to 
formally implement a link – and thus 
obey with the center’s request – but the 
links were hidden and did not generate 
the desired synergies among the centers 
in terms of overall web traffic. What was 
needed was the voluntary, proactive, 
cooperation of the centers, and not just 
their perfunctory cooperation.
The first step in solving this problem  
was to make the profit center managers 
aware of the large unexploited synergies 
and to show them the mutual gains from 
cooperation. This is a precondition for 
mobilizing the power of social norms to 
change behavior. In a next step, the center 
managers worked out a joint agreement 
where they defined a new set of very  
specific normatively appropriate behav-
iors to solve the cooperation problem, 
and each manager individually signed this 
agreement. Knowledge sharing between 
the profit centers was one of the desir-
able behaviors listed in the agreement: 
“We share our know-how between the 
profit centers. We appreciate that we can 
ask other profit center leaders for their 
expertise. We approach other profit cen-
ter leaders if we believe that our knowl-
edge and expertise adds value to them.” 
The integration of norm enforcement 
into the list of normatively appropriate 
behaviors was also a key part of the  
joint agreement. The importance of this  
component cannot be overstated, as it 
represents the normative basis, in fact  
the obligation, to provide feedback in 
response to norm violations. For example, 
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the joint agreement stated, “We will give 
direct feedback to those employees who 
do not comply”. The agreement also 
defined escalation stages in case of per-
sistent noncompliance: “If the respective 
employees do not change their behav- 
ior, we will escalate the issue to the com-
pliance committee.” This normative obli-
gation to provide feedback represents a 
clear and unambiguous invitation – and 
authorization – to provide feedback. 
Two additional measures completed the 
construction and implementation of a 
new set of behavioral norms in our 
example. First, an information campaign 
informed all employees of the new norms. 
Second, the firm changed their financial 
incentives to weaken the pecuniary free-
rider problem at the profit center level: 
Profit center managers’ compensation was 
partly tied to the overall performance of 
the media corporation. While this incentive 
change did not remove the free rider 
problem, it was an additional important 
message to strengthen the focus on syner-
gistic norm-based cooperation. 
This case study illustrates typical aspects 
of culture problems. The beauty of the 
solution is that it includes all ingredients 
that this Public Paper outlined to be 
important for achieving a cooperative 
corporate culture: 
First, people were made aware of the 
mutual gains from cooperation and the 
chosen approach ensured that the individ-
ual profit center would indeed have tan-
gible benefits from better overall coop- 
eration. This first step provides the basis 
for a change in the behavioral norms. 
Second, by committing individual profit 
centers and individual managers via a 
joint agreement to a set of cooperative 
behaviors, it generated a general expecta-
tion of increased cooperation. This alone 
causes already higher voluntary coop-
eration by itself. 
Third, when enforcing cooperative behav-
iors via feedback becomes a social norm, 
this fosters the general belief in everyone’s 
cooperation and establishes a credible 
peer-sanctioning system. As an important 
aspect of this system of feedback and 
sanctioning rules, providing feedback is 
entirely motivated with a normatively 
attractive goal, i.e., increasing the overall 
corporate performance. 
Last but not least, the psychological costs 
of providing feedback decrease and the 
costs of persistent noncompliance increase 
with a clear escalation path, thus raising 
the incentive to follow the feedback rules.
The normative obligation to pro-
vide feedback represents a clear 
invitation – and authorization –  
to do so.
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Improving decisions with nudging
The implications of behavioral economics are 
far-reaching, and its ideas – such as the con-
cept of nudge – have been applied to various 
domains, including personal and public finance, 
health, energy, public choice, and marketing. 
Nudge is a concept which argues that indirect 
suggestions and hints (e.g., reminders, mea-
sures that merely shift people’s attention) can 
influence the motives, incentives, and deci-
sion making of individuals – sometimes more 
effectively than direct instruction, legislation, 
or enforcement. Nudge is not about punish-
ing people if they do not act in a certain way. 
It is about making it easier for them to make a 
certain decision. For instance, putting the fruit 
at eye level counts as a nudge; banning junk 
food does not.
All over the world, public and private organiza-
tions are showing keen interest in “nudges”. In-
deed, using nudge as policy measure is proving 
increasingly popular. The former US president 
Barack Obama recruited behavioral economist 
Cass Sunstein as an adviser and exhorted US 
government departments to adopt behavioral 
economic concepts such as nudge. In 2010 the 
UK Government set up a Behavioural Insights 
Team, commonly dubbed a “nudge unit”, to 
develop policies. 
Nudge policy has worked in many different areas, 
such as organ donation. As in the UK, several 
countries have been rethinking their policy 
regulation on organ donation recently. This is due 
to the fact that in countries where people are au-
tomatically enrolled in organ donation schemes 
and have to actually opt out, like in Spain or 
Austria, only very few people do so – providing a 
far larger pool of organ donors. Another example 
is littering. The city of Lucerne for instance tried 
to encourage its citizens to properly dispose of 
their trash (see lower picture). The city launched 
its “Lucerne shines” program in 2011, which 
rolled out mazes, hopscotch boxes, and three 
point lines to make the act of trash disposal more 
fun. The city was awarded the “green can award” 
for the program.
Photo by clockworx/tiefgang design
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Corporate cultures are different, and so 
are corporate culture problems. Some 
problems are easily solved with simple 
nudges and awareness campaigns, while 
others require implementing a new set  
of strong social norms with associated 
enforcement rules. Looking at a large 
variety of culture problems and appro-
priate measures, the following classifica-
tion (Figure 6) has proven to be useful. 
Problems are classified along two dimen-
sions: the employees’ average willingness 
to comply voluntarily with the coope-
rative social norms, and the employees’ 
awareness of the negative effects that 
result from non-compliance. We simply 
distinguish only between “low” and 
“high” values on both axes. 
The cooperation problem among profit 
centers described above is located in the 
lower left corner of this matrix (Box IV): 
It required changing the awareness of the 
negative effects of noncooperation as 
well as changing the social (i.e., norm-
driven) and financial incentives.
 
Box I in the upper right corner reflects  
a situation where the negative conse-
quences of noncompliance on the com-
On the nature of corporate 
culture problems 
Examples illustrated in text
I  Expense report
II  Tourbillon watch
III  Piece rate system
IV  Media profit centers
Source: FehrAdvice AG
Fig. 6   Matrix to assess and address corporate culture problems   
Awareness 
of negative externalities
Willingness 
to comply voluntarily
low 
awareness
high 
awareness
high
willingness
low 
 willingness
Awareness and
Incentive Focus
Increase awarness 
and change incen-
tives
Incentive Focus
Change incentives 
and increase moti-
vation
Awareness Focus
Increase awareness
Attention Focus
Shift attention
II I
IV III
26
UBS Center Public Paper Behavioral Foundations of Corporate Culture
pany are clear and the employees are,  
in principle, quite willing to comply vol-
untarily: compliance requires only little 
extra effort, but at the same time, small 
distractions keep them from obeying the 
rules. In these cases, simple attention-
shifting nudges (e.g., reminders) may 
move the employee in the right direction. 
An example for this cultural problem is 
sloppiness in filling out expense reports 
and separating private from company 
expenses, typically a tedious task. Simple 
measures like confirming at the begin-
ning of the expense report to correctly 
report expenses (e.g., “I declare that I 
report my expenses truthfully and that I 
do not claim incidental private expenses”) 
or being made aware that “98% of all 
employees report their expenses truth-
fully” may effectively reduce sloppy 
reporting.
In box II (upper left corner), we face the 
problem that employees are quite willing 
to comply voluntarily, yet, they are not 
aware of negative externalities. Let us 
take a manufacturing line where employ-
ees are highly willing to produce a top-
notch product, e.g., tourbillon watch,  
yet management has not yet informed  
them that client needs have changed and  
the product no longer meets their require- 
ments. Here, a shift in awareness will 
help to improve the situation, ideally 
combined with stronger cooperation with 
the customer relations team. More gener-
ally, the interactions between complemen-
tary – noncompeting – units of a company 
are often characterized by asymmetric 
information and a lack of awareness of 
the needs of the other units; this is detri-
mental for the overall performance of  
the company. 
In box III (lower right corner) employees 
are aware that their behavior hurts the 
company, but they have strong incentives 
to do so. In this case the company needs 
to change employees’ motivation with 
appropriate measures. An example for 
such a problem relates to a system where 
piece rates incentivize employees’ perfor-
mance. It is a common approach for 
firms to set performance goals for their 
employees and pay a premium if they 
reach the goal. However, the firm has an 
incentive to adjust the goal if too many 
employees attain it. In a piece rate sys-
tem, for example, the piece rate is deter-
mined based on how many pieces a 
worker can typically produce, say, in a 
day or a month. The piece rate is initially 
set such that the workers earn the aver-
age-going market wage. However, if the 
initial assumption about what workers 
can produce in a given time is too low 
because workers learn and improve over 
time, workers earn more than the market 
wage, and the firm has a strong incentive 
to adjust the piece rate. To avoid such 
adjustments, however, workers often 
reduce their effort and disguise the fact 
that they could produce more. This kind 
of work ethic can also develop into a 
strong social norm – obviously, a coun-
terproductive norm that hurts the firm’s 
performance, and where workers are 
well aware that their shirking has this 
negative effect on the firm. To solve this 
problem, the firm must credibly commit 
to keep piece rates constant over a mutu-
ally agreed longer time as to remove the 
workers’ incentive to withhold effort. 
This measure is tantamount to a move-
ment along the vertical axis in Figure 6.
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Contractual incompleteness, the imperfec-
tions of centralized monitoring, and limits 
to contract enforcement naturally con-
strain firms’ ability to regulate and direct 
their employees’ behavior. This causes 
severe free-rider problems, which cooper-
ative corporate cultures can overcome by 
defining and implementing social norms 
geared towards increasing the company’s 
overall performance. A large share of the 
people is typically willing to follow proso-
cial norms at least partially if they believe 
that other people and, in particular the 
top leaders, will also comply. An impor-
tant ingredient, perhaps the most impor-
tant one, to legitimize cooperative norms 
is that they transparently increase the 
firm’s overall value and generate long-run 
benefits for the involved parties. 
As a firm’s workforce is typically com-
posed of people with different propensi-
ties for voluntary cooperation, it is 
inevitable that some of them will free ride 
on others’ efforts if sanctions do not 
enforce rules and norms. The failure to 
comply with norms has the tendency to 
spread if appropriate measures do not 
constrain it. However, forces similar to 
those that lead to contractual incomplete-
ness and imperfect monitoring also limit 
the centralized enforcement of norms. 
Peer feedback and peer sanctioning are, 
therefore, required for implementing and 
enforcing a cooperative culture. The opti-
mal conditions for the effectiveness of 
peer feedback exist when it becomes an 
integral part of a company’s corporate 
culture by making it a social norm and 
when all involved parties recognize that 
peer feedback increases the firm’s overall 
performance and all stakeholders benefit 
from it. Classifying corporate culture 
problems along the two dimensions “will-
ingness to cooperate” and “awareness of 
Summary 
negative externalities” has proven to be 
useful for determining the appropriate set 
of measures for solving these problems. 
Depending on the problem, the measures 
are in the areas of “changing awareness”, 
“changing incentives and motivation” or 
both.
A final important lesson is that the mere 
proclamation of abstract values does not 
suffice for achieving a cooperative culture. 
These values need to be translated into 
concrete behavioral rules on the “shop 
floor” that are widely shared and enforced 
by top management and the employees 
themselves. To engineer compliance, the 
behavioral rules must be clear and simple. 
Further, they must transparently contribute 
to a firm-specific public good, such that 
employees can agree with them – because 
otherwise they will not enforce them.
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